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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

Top Secret

119

28 November 1967

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Information as of 1600
28 November 1967

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HIGHLIGHTS

South Vietnamese Police Director Loan has agreed to postpone his resignation for several months.

I. Military Situation in South Vietnam: No large-scale engagements between allied and Communist forces were reported on 27-28 November; only small-scale attacks and harassing fire were reported from widespread sections of the country (Paras. 1-3).

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Enemy troops are improving their supply route through the A Shau Valley (Para. 8). Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy Province are having supply problems and losing control of the population, according to a captured document (Paras. 9-11).

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III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. Communist Political Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. No large-scale engagements between allied and Communist forces were reported on 27-28 November. There were small-scale attacks and guerrilla activities in much of South Vietnam.

2. The latest flurry of hit-and-run actions included mortar attacks on two US - South Vietnamese air bases in the delta. The airfields at Soc Trang in southern Ba Xuyen Province and at Rach Gia about 100 miles southwest of Saigon were hit early on 28 November. Damage to helicopters and observation planes was moderate. One American was killed and two others were wounded at Soc Trang, and three Americans were wounded at Rach Gia.

3. The increase in harassment, in the wake of the three-week battle at Dak To began with a series of 14 mortar attacks on allied targets in the delta provinces on 25-26 November. During the two-day period, the Communists also shelled two Special Forces camps, the US base at Nha Trang, and several US positions in the central highlands. These apparently coordinated attacks are probably designed to shift attention from the main force units, many of which are recovering from severe losses on several fronts.

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Enemy Activity in the A Shau Valley

8. Enemy troops are working on several bypasses around damaged sections of the road through the A Shau Valley.

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[redacted] at least one new bridge has been constructed just north of A Shau. In addition, vehicle tracks have been noted in the valley, indicating that the North Vietnamese have succeeded in trucking supplies from Laos into this region. The A Shau Valley is the most direct supply route from the Laotian infiltration corridor into the area south of Da Nang. The Communists are believed to have supply trails extending from A Shau down into the Quang Nam - Quang Tin Province border area where the North Vietnamese 2nd Division has been extremely active in recent months.

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Communist Problems in Phuoc Tuy Province

9. A Communist document, captured on 1 November in central Phuoc Tuy Province some 50 miles east of Saigon, provides information on the impact of recent allied operations on Viet Cong logistics and population control. The undated paper was prepared by a provincial supply authority and contains a complete recapitulation of allied activities throughout the southeastern area of III Corps from January to September of this year.

10. The document admitted that, as a result of allied sweep operations, especially along strategic highways, a great part of the population in Viet Cong - controlled areas has been resettled by allied forces. Listed in the study are 11 villages where the Communists lost control as well as a number of depots and transportation facilities which were destroyed.

11. The document speaks of a "critical situation" resulting from the tight allied control on the manpower and economic resources of the area and calls for an increased covert effort within government-controlled areas to compensate for allied pressure on the Communist logistics network. This is the second recent captured document which has emphasized development of Viet Cong installations in territory not under their control in order to meet the logistical demands of their forces in the area.

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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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
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